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This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors,
the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that
common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal
protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle.
We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively
related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are
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1. Overview of the issues.
In traditional finance of Modigliani and Miller (1958), securities are recognized by their
cash flows. For example, debt has a fixed promised stream of interest payments, whereas equity
entitles its owner to receiving dividends. Recent financial research has shown that this is fm from
the whole story, and that the defining feature of various securities is the rights that they bring to
.,
their owners (see, e.g., Hart 1995). Thus shares typically give their owners the right to vote for
directors of companies, whereas debt entitles creditors to, for example, the power to repossess
collateral when the company fails to make promised payments,
The rights attached to securities become tremendously important once it is recognized that
managers of companies act in their own interest. Investors’ rights give them the power to extract
from these managers the returns on their investment. Thus shareholders receive dividends
because they can vote out the directors who do not pay them, and creditors are paid because they
have the power to repossess collateral. Without these rights, investors would not be able to get
paid, and therefore firms would not have the benefit of raising finds from these investors, The
rights attached to securities are what managers and entrepreneurs give up to get finance,
But the view that securities are inherently characterized by some intrinsic rights is
incomplete as well, It ignores the obvious point that these rights depend on the legal rules of the
jurisdictions where these securities are issued. Does being a shareholder in France give an
investor the same privileges as being a shareholder in the United States, India, or Mexico? Would
a secured creditor in Germany fare as well when the borrower defaults as one in Taiwan or Italy,
assuming that the value of the collateral is the same in all cases? Law and the quality of its
enforcement are potentially important determinants of what rights security holders have and how3
well these rights are protected. Since the protection investors receive determines their readiness
to finance firms, corporate finance may critically turn on these legal rules and their enforcement.
Indeed, the differences in legal protections of investors might help explain why firms are
financed and owned so differently in different countries, Why do Italian companies rarely go
public (Pagano, Panetta and Zingales 1995)? Why does Germany have such a small stock market,
but also maintains very luge and powefil banks (Edwards and Fischer 1994)? My is the voting
premium -- the price of shares with high voting rights relative to that of shares with low voting
rights -- small in Sweden and the United States, and much larger in Italy and Israel (Levy 1982,
Rydquist 1987, Zingales 1994, 1995)? Indeed, why were Russian stocks nearly worthless
immediately tier privatization -- by some estimates one hundred times cheaper than Western
stocks backed by comparable assets -- and why did Russian companies have virtually no access to
external finance (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1993)? Why is ownership of large American and
British companies so widely dispersed (Berle and Means 1932)? The content of legal rules in
different countries may well shed light on these corporate governance puzzles,
In recent years, economists and legal scholars have begun to examine theoretically the
costs of benefits of alternative legal rules regarding investor rights (e.g., Bebchuk 1995, Bebchuk
and Zingales 1995, &omb 1993, Grossman and Hart 1988, Harris and Raviv 1988). The trouble
is, there are no systematic data available on what the legal rules pertaining to corporate
governance are around the world, how well these rules are enforced in different countries, and
what effect these rules have. There is no systematic knowledge, for example, of whether different
countries actually do have substantially different rules that might explain differences in their
financing patterns. Comparative statistical analysis of the legal underpimings of corporate finance4
-- and commerce more generally -- remains unchartered territory.
In this paper, we attempt to explore this territory. We examine empirically how laws
protecting investors differ across countries, how quality of enforcement of these laws varies, and
whether these variations matter for corporate ownership patterns around the world.
Our starting point is the recognition that laws in different countries are typically not
written from scratch, but rather transplanted -- voluntarily or otherwise -- from a few legal
families or traditions (Watson 1974). In general, commercial laws come from two broad
traditions: common law and civil law, Legal rules of civil law countries are derived from Roman
Law, and “are conceived as rules of conduct intimately linked to ideas of justice and morality”
(David and Brierley 1985, p. 22). These rules are usually developed by legal scholars, and
incorporated into commercial codes. In contrast, common law is British in origin, and was
“formed primarily by judges who tried to resolve specific disputes” (David and Brierley, p. 24).
Furthermore, there are only three major civil law traditions or families that modem commercial
laws originate from: French, German, and Scandinavian, The French and the German civil
traditions, as well as the common law tradition, have spread around the world through a
combination of conquest, imperialism, outright borrowing, and more subtle imitation. The
resulting laws reflect both the influence of their families and the revisions specific to individual
countries. As a result of this spread of legal families and the subsequent evolution of the laws, we
can compare both the individual legal rules and whole families across a large number of countries.
To this end, we have assembled a data set covering legal rules pertaining to the rights of
investors, and to the quality of enforcement of these rules, in 49 countries that have publicly
traded companies. For shareholders, some of the rules we examine cover voting powers, ease of5
participation in corporate voting, and legal protections against expropriation by management. For
creditors, some of these rules cover the respect for security of the loan, the ability to grab assets
in case of a loan default, and the inability of management to seek protection from creditors
unilaterally. In effect, these rules measure the ease with which investors can exercise their powers
against management. We also consider measures of the quality of enforcement of legal rules in
different countries and of the quality of their accounting systems. These data allow us to tell
which countries protect what types of investors, and how well they do it. We can also find out
how much of the differences between national laws is explained by the legal origin of these laws,
Our analysis yields some striking results. To begin, laws differ a great deal across
countries: an investor in France has very different legal rights than she does in Britain or Taiwan,
Moreover, a large part of this variation is accounted for by differences in legal origin, Civil laws
give investors weaker legal rights than common laws do. The most striking difference is between
common law countries, which give both shareholders and creditors the -- relatively speaking --
strongest protections, and French civil law countries, which protect investors the least. German
civil law and Scandinavian countries fall between common law and French civil law countries in
the strength of legal investor protection. The quality of law enforcement is the highest in
Scandinavian and German civil law countries, next highest in common law countries, and again
the lowest in French civil law countries, Finally, these results are not just a consequence of
different income levels in countries with different laws. All the evidence thus suggests the
weahess of the legal protections afforded investors in French civil law countries compared to
those in common law countries, regardless of income levels.
But showing that law and its enforcement varies across countries and legal families is only6
the beginning of the story. The nefi question is how do the countries with poor laws or their
enforcement cope with this problem? Do their firms get no financing at all, or do these countries
have other, substitute mechanisms of corporate governance? These mechanisms maybe in fact
incorporated into the law, or they may lie outside the law. In addition to establishing the
significant differences in investor protection across legal systems, this paper begins to examine
some of the possible adaptations to the lack of investor protection,
One potential adaptation to fewer laws is strong enforcement of laws, but as we pointed
out above this does not appear to be the case empirically. Another possible -- legal -- adaptation,
which legal scholars sometimes refer to as “bright line” rules, is to legally introduce mandatory
standards of retention and distribution of capital to investors, which limit the opportunities for
managerial expropriation. Indeed, we find that French civil law countries are more likely to have
such bright line legal rules, namely mmdato~ dividends and maintenance of legal capital reserves,
than the rest of the countries.
Perhaps the most interesting adaptation to the lack of legal protections that we examine is
ownership concentration. Some concentration of ownership of a firm’s shares is typically efficient
to provide managers with an incentive to work, and large investors with an incentive to monitor
the managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Shleifer and Vishny 1986), However, some dispersion
of ownership among small investors is also desirable to diversifi risk. As argued by Shleifer and
Vishny (1996), ownership concentration may actually become excessive when small investors do
not have enough legal rights to secure a return on their investment, and hence avoid holding
shares. When the law protects investors, they can remain small and still hope to get something
back on their money, When the law does not protect them, investors have to be large and7
powefil to stand up to the management and extract payments from them,
In this paper, we examine ownership concentration in the largest publicly traded
companies in the countries in our smple, and find a strong negative correlation between
concentration of ownership, as measured by the combined stake of the three largest shareholders,
and the quality of legal protection of investors in a country, The substitute for poor investor
,
protection in French civil.law countries is extremely concentrated ownership, and by consequence
lack of significant public equity markets. The data on ownership concentration thus cofirms the
idea that legal systems matter for corporate governance, and that firms have to adapt to the
limitations of the legrd systems that they operate in.
The next section of the paper describes the countries and their laws. Sections 3 and 4 then
compare shareholder and creditor rights, respectively, in different countries and different legal
traditions, Section 5 compares the quality of law etiorcement and accounting standards in
different countries and legal traditions. Section 6 focuses on ownership. In section 7, we
examine and reject the hypothesis that poverty accounts for poor investor protection, although the
quality of legal enforcement clearly improves with income. Section 8 summarizes our findings.
2, Countries, Legal Families, and Legal Rules.
Countries
Most studies of corporate governance focus on one, or a few, wealthy economies (see,
e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995, Berglof and Perotti 1994, Gorton and Schmidt 1995, Kaplan and
Minton 1994). However, corporate governance in all of the three economies that scholars
typically focus on -- the United States, Germany, and Japan -- is quite effective, To understand8
better the role of legal protection of investors, we need to examine a larger sample of countries,
To this end, we have assembled as comprehensive a sample as possible of countries that have
some non-financial firms traded on their stock exchanges. The sample covers 49 countries from
Europe, North and South Americ~ Afi-ica, Asia, and Australia. There are no socialist or
“transition” economies in the sample. A country is selected for inclusion i~ based on the
WorldScope sample of 1$,900 firms from 33 countries and the Moody’s International sample of
15,100 non-U. S. firms from 92 countries, that country had at least five domestic non-financial
publicly traded firms in 1993. We restrict attention to countries that have publicly traded firms
since our primary focus is on protecting investor rights, and without public shareholders a
discussion of investor rights would be limited, Having at least five non-financial firms is also
essential for construction of ownership data,
Legal Families
Comparative legal scholars agree that, even though no two nations’ laws are exactly alike,
some national legal systems are sufficiently similar in certain critical respects to permit
classification of national legal systems into major families of law. Although there is no unanimity
among legal scholars on how to define legal families, “among the criteria often used for this
purpose are the following: (1) historical background and development of the legal system, (2)
theones and hierarchies of sources of law, (3) the working methodology of jurists within the legal
systems, (4) the characteristics of legal concepts employed by the system, (5) the legal institutions
of the system, and (6) the divisions of law employed within a system” (Glendon et al 1992, pp. 4-
5), Based on this approach, scholars identifi two broad legal traditions that pertain to matters9
discussed in this paper: civil law and common Ia#,
The civil, or Romano-Germanic, legal tradition is the oldest, the most itiuential, and the
most widely distributed tradition around the world. It originates in Roman law, uses statutes and
comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material, and relies heavily on legal
scholars to ascertain and formulate its rules (Merryman 1969). Legal scholars typically identifi
three currently common families of laws within the civil law tradition: French, Germq and
Scandinavian. The French Commercial Code was written under Napoleon in 1807, and brought
by his armies to Belgium, the Netherlands, part of Poland, Italy, and Western regions of Germany,
In the colonial era, France extended her legal itiuence to the Near East and Northern and Sub-
Saharan Africa, Indochina, Oceania, and French Caribbea islands. French legal influence has
been significant as well in Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, some of the Swiss cantons, and Italy
(Glendon et d. 1994). When the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Latin America dissolved in
the 19th century, it was mainly the French civil law that the lawmakers of the new nations looked
to for inspiration. Our sample contains 21 countries with laws in the French civil tradition.
The German Commercial Code was written in 1897 afier Bismarck’s unification of
Germany, and perhaps because it was produced several decades later, was not as widely adopted
as the French Code. It had an important irdluence on the legal theory and doctrine in Austria,
2The religious traditions, such as Jewish law, Canon Law, Hindu law, and Muslim law,
appear to be less relevant in matters of investor protections. “Thus the Arabian countries
unquestionably belong to Islamic law as far as family and inheritance law is concerned, just as
India belongs to Hindu law, but economic law of these countries (including commercial law and
the law of contract and tort) is heavily impressed by the legal thinking of the colonial and
mandatory powers -- the Common Law in the case of India, French law in the case of most of the
Arab States” (Zweigert and Kotz 1987, p, 66). We focus on the principal secular legal traditions
in this study.10
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan and Korea. Taiwan’s
laws came from China, which borrowed heavily from the Geman Code during its modernization.
We have 6 countries from this family in our sample.
The Scandinavian ftily is usually viewed as part of the civil law tradition, although its
law is less derivative of Roman law than the French and German ftilies (Zweigert and Kotz
1987). Although Nordic countries had civil codes as fm back as the 18th centu~, these codes
are not used any more. Most writers describe the Scandinavian laws as similar to each other but
“distinct” fi-om others, so we keep the 4 Nordic countries in our sample as a separate family.
The family referred to as the common law tradition includes the law of England and those
laws modeled on English law. The common law is formed by judges who have to resolve specific
disputes. Precedents from judicid decisions, as opposed to contributions by the scholars, shape
common law. Common law has spread to British colonies, including the United States, Canada,
Australia, India, and many other countries. There are 18 common law countries in our sample.
Zweigert andKotz(1987) offer a colofil characterization of the differences between
common and civil law: “The tradition of the English Common Law has been one of gradual
development from decision to decision: historically speaking, it is case law, not enacted law. On
the Continent, the development since the reception of Roman law has been quite different, from
the interpretation of the Justinian’s Corpus Iuris to the codification, nation by nation, of abstract
rules. So common law comes horn the court, Continental Law from the study; the great jurists of
England were judges, on the Continent professors. On the Continent lawyers, faced with a
problem, even a new and unforeseen one, ask what solution the rule provides; in England and the
United States they predict how the judge would deal with the problem, given existing decisions.11
These differences in style run through the whole legal system. On the Continent lawyers think
abstractly, in terms of institutions; in England concretely, in terms of cases, the relationship of the
parties, ‘rights and duties.’ On the Continent, the system is conceived as being complete and free
from gaps, in England lawyers feel their way gradually from case to case. On the Continent
lawyers delight in systematic, in England they are skeptical of every generalization. On the
Continent lawyers operatp with ideas, which often, dangerously enough, take on a life of their
own; in England they thih in pictures; and so one could continue. ”
To classify countries into legal ftilies, we rely principally on a publication of the
American ~sociation of Law Libraries called “Foreign Law: Current Sources of Codes and Basic
Legislation in Jurisdictions Around the World” (Reynolds and Flores, 1989), In most cases, such
classification is uncontroversial. In some cases, however, while the basic origin of laws is clear,
laws over time have been amended to incorporate the needs of the adopting country as well as
influences from other ftilies. For example, although Ecuador is a French civil law country, its
company law was revised in 1977 in part to incorporate some common law rules. Wer World
War II, the American occupying army changed some Japanese laws, although their basic German
civil law structure remained. While Italian laws originate in the French tradition, over years they
had some German influence. In all these -- and several other -- cases, we have classified a country
based on the original structure of the laws it adopted, rather than on the revisions.
One potential difficulty for our classification is posed by the attempt to harmonize West
European laws currently underway in the European Community (Andenas and Kenyon-Slade
1993, Werlauff 1993). The Community has issued several directives designed to uni~ European
commercial laws, including some of the laws that pertain to corporate governance. Severalcountries have changed their
directives are not mandatory,
12
laws to adhere to EC directives. However, in most instances,
and the countries are given some time to change their laws.
Moreover, the EC directives accommodate a great deal of diversity between countries. As
the
of
1993-1994-- the point in time when we examine the legal rules of the countries in our sample --
EC harmonization has not generally affected the legal rules that we focus on. The one area where
the EC impact has been large, namely mergers and acquisitions, is not an area that we examine in
this paper (see below).
Legal Rules
In this paper, we look at a fairly narrow range of differences between laws, namely those
pertaining to investor protection, To this end, we examine two types of laws: company laws and
bankruptcy/ reorganization laws. Company laws exist in all countries, and are concerned with (1)
the legal relations between corporate insiders (members of the corporation, i.e., shareholders,
directors) and the corporation itself and (2) the legal relations between the corporation and
certain outsiders, particularly creditors, Bankruptcy/ reorganization laws apply more generally
than just to companies, but deal specifically with procedures that unfold in the case of failure to
pay back debt, All these laws are part of the commercial codes in civil law countries, and exist as
separate laws, mainly in the form of Acts, in common law countries.
Although the focus on these two sources of law gives us a lot of data, there are several
conspicuous omissions from the data set. First, this paper says little about merger and takeover
rules, except indirectly by looking at voting mechanisms, These rules are spread between
company laws, anti-trust laws, security laws, stock exchange regulations, and sometimes bankingregulations as well,
legal harmonization.
13
Moreover, these rules have changed significantly in Europe as part of EC
Until now, takeovers have been an important governance tool mainly in a
few civil law countries, although the situation may change, We defer an analysis of these rules to
a separate paper,
Second, this paper also says little about disclosure rules, which again come from many
sources, including comp~y laws, security laws, and stock exchange regulations, and are also
intended for harmonization across the European Community One important caveat here is that
we do look at the quality of accounting standards, which to a significant extent is a consequence
of the disclosure rules.
Third, we do not in this paper use any information from regulations imposed by security
exchanges. One instance where this is relevant is exchange-imposed restrictions on the voting
rights for the shares that companies can issue if these shares are to be traded on the exchange.
Finally, a potentially important set of rules that we do not deal with here is banking and
financial institution regulations, which might take the form of restricting bank ownership, for
example, Much has been made of these regulations in the United States by Roe (1994). Again,
we defer their codification and examination to fiture work.
An inspection of company and bankruptcy laws suggests numerous potentially measurable
differences among countries. Here we focus only on some of the most basic rules that observers
of corporate governance around the world (e.g., Paul Vishny 1994, Investor Responsibility
Research Center 1994, Institutional Shareholder Sefices 1994, White 1993, American Bar
Association 1989 and 1993) believe to be critical to the quality of shareholder and creditor legal
rights. Moreover, we focus on variables that prima facie are interpretable as either pro-investor14
or pro-management, since this is the dimension along which we are trying to assess countries and
legal ftilies. There are obvious differences in rules between countries, such as for example tier
structures of boards of directors, that we do not examine because we cannot ascertain which of
these rules are more sympathetic to shareholders. Investor rights, as well as the other variables
we use in this paper, are summarized in Table 1. We discuss individual variables in more detail in
the sections where they we analyzed. The Appendix summarizes by country the data sources that
were used to construct the data set3.
Some Conceptual Issues
The goal of our research, as we already mentioned, is to establish whether laws pertaining
to investor protection differ across countries and whether these differences have consequences for
corporate finance. This research design immediately poses some conceptual problems. To begin,
some scholars, such as Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), are skeptical that legal rules are binding in
most instances, since ofien firms can opt out of these rules in their corporate charters, which
effectively serve as contracts between entrepreneurs and investors, Indeed, in many countries,
firms can opt out of some of the rules we examine. As a practical matter, however, it maybe
costly for firms to opt out of standard legal rules since investors might have difficulty accepting
non-standard contracts and, more importantly, judges might ftil to understand or enforce them,
Perhaps for this reason, standard legal rules appear to have some bite, Even more important, the
3The data collected for this paper come from multiple sources, ranging from publicly and
commercially available data sets, to respective countries’ laws and commentaries on these laws.
We have been able to obtain nearly complete data for over 45 countries, and taken some care to
assure their accuracy. The tables in this paper present all the data on legal rights and their
enforcement that we use in the analysis.15
question of whether legal rules matter is fundamentally empirical: if opting out were cheap and
simple, we would not find that legal rules matter for patterns of corporate ownership and finance
Even if we were to find that legal rules matter, it would be possible to argue that these
rules endogenously adjust to economic reality, and hence the differences in rules and outcomes
simply reflect the differences in some other, exogenous conditions across countries. Perhaps
some countries chose to have ordy bank finance of firms for political reasons, and then adjusted
their laws accordingly to protect banks and discourage shareholders. For some individual rules,
this is surely the case, However, this is where our focus on the legal origin becomes crucial.
Countries typically adopted their legal systems involuntarily (through conquest or colonization),
and even when they chose a legal system freely, as in the case of former Spanish colonies, the
crucial consideration was language and the broad political stance of the law rather than the
treatment of investor protections. The legal family can therefore be treated as exogenous to a
country’s structure of corporate ownership and finance. If we find that legal rules differ
substantially across legal ftilies, and that so do financing and ownership patterns, we have a
strong case that legal ftilies, as expressed in the legal rules, actually affect outcomes,
Finally, this paper takes the rather standard point of view that investor protections
contribute to external financing of firms, and hence to economic efficiency. This need not
necessarily be the case, A country might develop and grow with limited legal protections of
outside investors, and with only internal and state finance of firms, Our paper does not address
this theoretical issue; it rather relies on the existing research (sumeyed, e.g., by Shleifer and
Vishny 1996) to presume that investor protections are good for economic efficiency.16
3, Shareholder rights.
We begin by considering shareholder rights from company laws. Because shareholders
exercise their power by voting for directors, experts focus on voting procedures in evaluating
shareholder rights. These include: voting rights attached to shares, rights that support the voting
mechanism against interference by the insiders, and what we call remedial rights. To begin,
investors may be better protected when dividend rights are tightly linked to voting rights, i,e.
companies in a country are subject to one-share-one-vote rules (Grossman and Hart 1988, Harris
and Raviv 1988)4. The idea is that, when votes are tied to dividends, insiders cannot appropriate
cash flows to themselves by controlling ordy a small share of the company’s cash flows but still
maintaining voting control. There are many ways out of the one-share-one-vote principle that
laws in different countries accommodate. Companies can issue non-voting shares, low and high-
voting shares, founders’ shares with extremely high voting rights, or shares whose votes increase
when they are held longer, as in France. Companies can also restrict the total number of votes
that any given shareholder can exercise at a shareholders’ meeting, regardless of how many votes
he controls, We say that a country has one-share one-vote if none of these practices is allowed by
law. In our sample, only 11 countries impose genuine one-share one-vote rules,
The next five rights are much more straightforward, and essentially describe how easy it is
for shareholders to exercise their voting rights, Because these rights measure how strongly the
legal system favors shareholders (against managers) in the voting process, we refer to them as
anti-director rights. First, in some countries, shareholders must show up in person, or send an
40ne of the European Community directives recommends the adoption of one-share-one-
vote rules throughout the Community. It does not appear that this directive is being incorporated
into national laws too rapidly,17
authorized representative, to a shareholders’ meeting to be able to vote, In other countries, in
contrast, they can vote by mail, which makes it easier for them to cast their votes, In Japan, for
example, about 80 percent of companies hold their annual meeting on the same week, and voting
by mail is not allowed, which makes it difficult for shareholders to exercise their votes unless they
go through a legal procedure of designating their proxies at the meetings.
Second, in some gountries, law requires that shareholders deposit their shares with the
company or a financial intermediary several days prior to a shareholder meeting. The shares are
then kept in custody until a few days after the meeting. This practice prevents shareholders from
selling their shares for several days around the time of the meeting, and keeps shareholders who
do not bother to go through this exercise from voting,
Third, some countries allow cumulative voting for directors, which in principle gives more
power for minority shareholders to put their representatives on boards of directors.
Fourth, some countries give minority shareholders legal mechanisms to be used against
perceived oppression by directors. These mechanisms may include the right to sue directors (as in
the American derivative suits) or the right to force the company to purchase shares of the
shareholders who object to certain fundamental changes, such as mergers or asset sales.
Fifth, we look at the percentage of share capital needed to call an extraordinary
shareholders’ meeting. Presumably, the higher this percentage is, the harder it is for minority
shareholders to organize a meeting to challenge or oust the management. This percentage varies
around the world from 1 percent in some U. S. states to 33 percent of share capital in Mexico.
Finally, we combine these five anti-director rights into an aggregate anti-director rights
measure described in Table 1.18
The last shareholder rights measure, which we treat a bit differently from others, is the
right to a mandatory dividend. In some countries, companies are mandated by law to pay out a
certain fraction of their declared earnings as dividends, Earnings of course can be misrepresented
within the limits allowed by the accounting system, so this measure is not as tough as it looks, but
at least it prevents declarations of high earnings, which might be needed to raise additional finds,
without dividend payouts. The mandatory dividend right may be needed when other rights of
shareholders are too weak to induce them to invest. We test this hypothesis in Section 5.
Table 2 presents the data on shareholder rights, where the vrdues of all variables are listed
by country, and countries are organized by legal origin. Columns in Table 2 generally correspond
to particular legal provisions concerning shareholder rights, and the values in the tables are
dummies indicating whether a country has the particular legal provision. Table 2 also presents
equality of means tests for all the variables by origin.
An examination of world means of the variables in Tables 2 suggests that relatively few
countries have legal rules favoring outside shareholders. Ordy 22 percent of the countries have
one share one vote, ordy 16 percent allow cumulative voting, ordy 22 percent allow voting by
mail, and only 53 percent protect oppressed minorities. One could argue that other -- private --
mechanisms facilitate external equity finance, such as the managerial reputations (Gomes 1996).
The point here is only that shareholder protections do not very ofien come from legal rules.
The other clear result in Table 2 is that, for many variables, the origin of laws matters.
Although we present more formal statistical tests of this proposition later in this section, Table 2
shows that the means of shareholder rights variables are statistically significantly different between
origins. Two variables where most origins are similar are one-share-one-vote, which is an19
uncommon restriction everywhere (and never happens in Scandinavia, which is therefore
different), and cumulative voting, which is also uncommon everywhere (and never happens in
Scandinavia, which is therefore different). With other variables, the differences in shareholder
rights between legal origins are more substantial,
Specifically, two major facts emerge from Table 2. First, along a variety of dimensions,
common law countries word the best legal protections to shareholders. They most frequently
(39%) allow shareholders to vote by mail, they never block shares for shareholder meetings, they
have the highest (92Yo) incidence of laws protecting oppressed minorities, and they generally
require relatively few shares (90A)to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. Not surprisingly,
they also have the highest of all legal ftilies aggregate anti-director rights score (3.39), including
the only perfect 5 for the United States. Many of these differences between common law and civil
law countries are statistically significant. In short, relative to the rest of the world, common law
countries have a better package of laws protecting shareholders.
Second, along a broad range of dimensions, French civil law countries afford the worst
legal protections to shareholders. Although they look average on one-share-one-vote (24%) and
cumulative voting (190A), they have the lowest (90A)incidence of allowing voting by mail, a high
(43%, though not as high as German civil law countries) incidence of blocking shares for
shareholder meetings, a low (33°/0,though not as low as Nordic countries) incidence of laws
protecting oppressed minorities, and the highest (14%) percentage of share capital needed to call
an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. On the aggregate anti-director rights measure, French
civil law countries look the worst (1. 76), The differences between French civil law and common
law are large and statistically significant, although other civil law families are not evidently more20
protective of shareholders than the French civil law countries are, Interestingly, even France
itself, except for allowing proxies by mail, does not have good legal protections of shareholders.
These results suggest that shareholders in the two most widely-spread legal regimes: common law
and French civil law, operate in very different legal environments.
The Germm civil law countries are in general located between the two extremes, but
closer to the French family. They have a relatively high frequency of one-share one-vote rules
(because of East Aia) and require relatively few votes to call an extraordinary meeting, but they
also typically block shares for shareholder meetings and rarely allow voting by mail. The average
anti-director score for this family is 2.00 -- closer to the French family than to the common law
family, Scandinavia presents a mixed picture, with an aggregate anti-director score of 2,50, For
example, only Denmark appears to have oppressed minority protections, and only Norway allows
voting by mail,
The one remedial measure in Table 2, namely mandatory dividend, shows that mandatory
dividends are used on~ in French civil law countries. This result is broadly consistent with the
rest of our evidence, and suggests that mandatory dividends are indeed a remedial legal protection
for shareholders who have relatively few other legal rights.
The final task of this section is to ask whether, in a statistical sense, once we consider all
the legal rules at once, legal origin matters, In addressing this question, we must examine
shareholder and creditor rights together, even though we discuss the results on creditor rights in
the next section, We can also deal with another potential concern (addressed in more detail in
section 7), namely that differences in legal origin just reflect differences in per capita income
levels, Accordingly, we estimate a stacked regression using all the variables from Table 2 (other21
than the aggregate anti-director variable) plus the five creditor rights (described in Table 3 and the
next section) as dependent variables, and origin dummies and levels of GNP per capita in each
country as independent variables. Because within a country specific laws are correlated with each
other, the appropriate estimation method is Seemingly Unrelated Regression. We can then
perform F-tests of the hypothesis that origin matters for shareholder rights. The results of the
regressions are presented in Table 4, and the F-tests in Table 5,
The results in Table 4 cofirm the findings of Table 2 that civil law, and especially French
civil law, countries have inferior protections of shareholders to those of the common law
countries. Controlling for per capita income does not change this result (we return to per capita
income in section 7). The tests in Panel A of Table 5 furthermore show that, even controlling for
per capita income levels, legal origin matters for laws protecting shareholders, With reasonable
cofidence, we can reject the hypothesis that any given origin has the same laws as the rest of the
world, Moreover, the table shows that the two origins that are most different from the others are
French civil law and common law. We can also reject the hypotheses that the laws in the German
family are the same as those in either the French or the common law fmilies.
These formal tests are consistent with the principal finding of this section, namely that
common law countries have the relatively better protections of shareholders, and the French civil
law countries have the worst ones5. A minority shareholder in Australia or South Africa can vote
5Some European legal scholars have objected to this conclusion on the grounds that our
selection of variables was biased toward finding common law countries more protective of
investors. One variable that these scholars objected to our not using is the mandato~ preemptive
right to buy new shares given by many European countries to the existing shareholders.
Originally, this right did not appear to us to be critical, which is why we did not include it. Mer
this criticism, we have analyzed the data on this right, although we did not include the results in
the basic tables since this right was selected to favor civil law countries, As it happens, 5622
by mail, can trade his shares during a shareholders’ meeting, is protected from certain
expropriations by directors, and needs to have only 5°/0of share capital to call an extraordinary
meeting. A minority shareholder in Italy or Belgium, in contrast, cannot vote by mail, has tis
shares blocked during the shareholder meeting, is not protected from expropriation by directors
and needs to have 20°/0 of share capital to call for an extraordinary meeting. The differences
between legal origins come out loud and clear from this analysis of shareholder rights.
4. Creditor Rights.
Conceptually, creditor rights are more complex than shareholder rights. The reason is that
creditors exercise their power in several ways. Perhaps the most basic creditor right is the right to
repossess -- and then liquidate or keep -- collateral when a loan is in default (see Hart 1995).
For collateralized loans, the power of creditors against borrowers depends largely on the ease of
repossessing collateral. In some countries, law makes it difficult for the lenders to repossess
collateral, in part because such repossession leads to liquidation of firms that is viewed as socially
undesirable. In these countries, lenders may still have some powers against borrowers, namely
their votes in the decisions for how to reorganize the company and pay off the creditors. The
creditor rights that experts consider to be essential for debt finance are the rights to repossess
collateral and to have a say in reorganization (see Paul Vishny 1994, Aghion, Hart, and Moore
percent of common law countries have this rule, compared to 76 percent of French civil law
countries (t = 1.36), 50 percent of German civil law countries (t = .23 in the comparison to
common law), and 100 percent of Scandinavian countries ( t = -3.69 in the comparison to
common law). Thus the principal comparison of common law to French, and even German, civil
law families is not materially affected by the inclusion of this variable. We have also checked all
our firther results and none are affected by the inclusion of this measure of preemptive
shareholder rights.23
1992, Baird 1995, White 1993).
We use five creditor rights variables in this analysis. First, in some countries, the
reorganization procedure imposes an automatic stay on the assets, thereby preventing secured
creditors from getting possession of loan collateral. This rule obviously protects managers and
unsecured creditors against secured creditors and prevents automatic liquidation. In Greece, for
example, secured credito~s have the right for foreclose on their property when their claim matures
and not when the borrower defaults (Guide to Insolvency in Europe 1989, p, 112). In other
countries, in contrast, secured creditors can pull collateral from firms being reorganized without
waiting for completion of reorgtition.
Second, some countries do not assure the secured creditors the right to collateral in
reorganization. In these, admittedly rare, countries, secured creditors are in line behind the
Government and workers, who have absolute priority over them. To use Mexico as an example,
various social constituencies need to be repaid before the secured creditors, ofien leaving the
latter with no assets to back up their claims,
Third, with respect to reorganizatio~ management in some countries can seek protection
from creditors unilaterally by filing for reorgtiation, without creditor consent, Such protection
is called Chapter 11 in the United States, and gives management a great deal of power against
creditors, since at best creditors can get their money or collateral only with a delay. In other
countries, in contrast, creditor consent is needed to file for reorganization, and hence managers
cannot so easily escape creditor demands.
Finally, in some countries, management stays pending the resolution of the reorganization
procedure, whereas in other countries, such as Malaysia, management is replaced by a party24
appointed by the court or the creditors, This threat of dismissal may enhance creditors’ power.
As with shareholder rights, we use one remedial creditor rights measure, namely the
existence of a legal reserve requirement. This requirement forces firms to maintain a certain level
of capital to avoid automatic liquidation. It protects creditors when they have few other powers
in that it forces an automatic liquidation before all the capital is stolen or wasted by the insiders.
The results on creditor rights are presented in Table 3, which is organized in the same way
as Table 2. In general, the protections of creditor rights analyzed here are more common than the
protections of shareholder rights. Over half the countries restrict the managers’ right to seek
protection from creditors unilaterally, 85 percent pay secured creditors first, nearly half do not
have automatic stay on assets, and 43 percent remove management in reorganization proceedings,
As in Table 2, we see that, for many creditor rights, the legal origin matters (again we defer the F-
tests to the end of this section). Moreover, the ranking of origins by the extent of investor
protection is similar for creditors to what it is for shareholders.
Common law countries offer creditors better legal protections against managers. They
most frequently (710/0, roughly tied with Scandinavia) preclude managers from unilaterally seeking
court protection from creditors; they have the lowest (29°/0) incidence of allowing automatic stay
on assets; with one exception, they guarantee that secured creditors are paid first (as do German
civil law and Scandinavian families); and they have far and away the lowest (24°/0) incidence of
managers staying on the job in reorganization proceedings. The United States is actually one of
the most anti-creditor common law countries: it allows unimpeded petition for reorganization,
permits automatic stay on assets, and lets managers keep their jobs in reorganization.
Creditor rights results also resemble those for shareholder rights in that the French civil25
law countries offer creditors the weakest protections. Few of them (42Y0 -- still more than
German civil law countries) place restrictions on managers seeking court protection from
creditors, many (74°/0, tied with Scandinavia) allow the automatic stay on assets, relatively few
(68%) assure that secured creditors are paid first, and the vast majority (74%, though not as many
as in Scandinavia) allow managers to stay on the job in reorganization proceedings.
On some measure,s, countries in the German civil law ftily are strongly pro-creditor. For
instance, relatively few (33°/0) of them allow automatic stay and secured creditors in all of them
are paid first. On the other hand, relatively few of these countries (33°/0) prevent managers fi-om
getting protection from creditors unilaterally, and most (67VO)allow managers to stay in
reorganization. One view of this evidence is that the German civil law countries are very
responsive to secured creditors by not allowing automatic stay and by letting them pull collateral,
As a consequence of making liquidation easy, these countries rely lesson reorganization of
defaulting firms, and hence being sofi on such firms by letting managers stay may not be a big
problem. Scandinavia, as before, has some pro-management and some pro-creditor laws. The
main differences, as with shareholders, are between common law and French civil law countries.
The evidence on the one remedial pro-creditor legal rule in the sample, namely the legal
reserve requirement, is consistent with the rest of our findings. Specifically, these requirements
almost never exist in common law countries, where other investor protections presumably suffice.
On the other hand, these requirements are more common in all civil law countries, Since legal
reserve requirements are likely to protect unsecured creditors in particular, it is not surprising that
they are relatively common in the German civil law countries, which tend to be as bad as the
French civil law countries in treating unsecured creditors. Remedial rights, then, are used when26
other investor powers are insufficient to enable them to earn returns on their investments.
From this analysis, it appears that the ranking of origins is roughly the same for creditor
and shareholder protections. Some legal ftilies -- relatively speaking -- protect all investors, and
others protect none. It does not appear that some legal ftilies protect shareholders and others
protect creditors. We can ask this question more formally by looking at the correlations, across
countries, between shareholder and creditor rights measures. This is done in Table 6. The results
do not support the hypothesis that countries protect either shareholders or creditors, and if
anything, suggest the reverse. For example, the correlation of oppressed minority rights is .08
with restrictions on managers unilaterally seeking protection from creditors, -.23 with having an
automatic stay on assets, ,18 with having secured creditors first in line, and -,33 with managers
German civil law countries are partial to secured creditors.
and 5 and formally ask the question whether origin matters for
staying in reorganization. In short, we have no systematic evidence that legal rules discriminate
between investor types, except that
Next, we return to Tables 4
creditor rights, Table 4 confirms the results in Table 3 that, for several creditor rights, origin
matters, even after controlling for per capita income. The formal tests show even more strongly
than for shareholder rights that origin matters. Every family of laws (other than Nordic) is
statistically different from the rest of the world, and common law countries are different from civil
law countries. We can reject the hypothesis that French civil law countries have the same creditor
rights as German civil law countries. The last panel of Table 5 pulls shareholder and creditor
rights together and cotirms the result that laws in different families are different. With all the
data pulled together, we actually reject the hypothesis that any two fmilies of laws are the sameb.LI
To summarize, our results on shareholder and creditor rights paint a very straightforward
picture, Laws differ a great deal across countries, and in particular they differ because they come
horn different legal ftilies, Relatively speaking, common law countries protect investors the
most, and French civil law countries protect them the least. German civil law countries are in the
middle, though probably closer to the civil law group. The one exception is the strong
protections that German civil law countries afford secured creditors. Scandinavian countries have
some strong and some weak protections of investors, The statistical evidence indicates that these
results are not a consequence of different income levels of countries with different laws.
These results raise some questions. If poor investor protections are actually costly to
companies in terms of their ability to raise finds, then do countries compensate for these
shortcomings in other ways? We have already shown that French civil law countries have a
higher incidence of remedial or bright line legal protections, such as mandatory dividends and
legal reserves. But there may be other strategies to compensate, at least in part, for investor-
unfi-iendly laws. One of them -- examined in the next section -- is strict and effective enforcement
of the laws that do exist. The other -- examined in section 6 -- is concentrated ownership.
Although we try to examine all the components of the legal system, the superiority of common
law, and inferiority of the French civil law, in protecting investors is a key finding of our paper.
5. Enforcement.
bWe have also conducted these tests controlling for geography, dividing the world into
Australia, Europe, Afi-ica, Asia, and America. In the combined comparison of shareholder and
creditor rights, only the difference between Scandinavia and the rest of the world loses
significance; all the remaining differences remain highly statistically significant.28
Legal rules are ordy one element of investor protection; the enforcement of these rules
may be equally, or even more, important. A strong system of legal enforcement could even
substitute for weak rules, since active and well-functioning courts can step in and rescue investors
abused by the management. To address these issues, in addition to measures of investors’ legal
rights, this paper examines proxies for the quality of enforcement of these rights, namely estimates
of “law and order” in different countries compiled by credit risk agencies. These measures are
collected by private firms for the use of foreign investors interested in doing btisiness in the
respective countries. We use five of these measures: efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law,
corruption, risk of expropriation -- meaning outright cordiscation or forced nationalization -- by
the government, and likelihood of contract repudiation by the government, The first two of these
measures obviously pertain to law enforcement proper; the last three deal more generally with the
government’s stance toward business. Some of these measures have been previously shown to
affect national growth rates (Keefer and Knack 1995).
In addition to these rule of law variables, this study uses an estimate of the quality of a
country’s accounting standards. Accounting plays a potentially critical role in corporate
governance, For investors to know anything about the companies they invest in, some basic
accounting standards are needed to render company disclosures interpretable, Even more
important, contracts between managers and investors typically rely on some measures of firms’
income or assets being verifiable in court. If a bond covenant stipulates immediate repayment
when income falls below a certain level, this level of income must be verifiable for the bond
contract to be even in principle enforceable in court. Accounting standards might then be
necessary for financial contracting, especially if investor rights are weak (Hay, Shleifer and Vishny29
1996), Themeasure ofaccounting standards weuse, likethe mleoflaw measures, isaptivately
constructed index based on examination of company reports from different countries.
Unfortunately, it is available for ordy 44 countries, 41 of which are in our sample’.
Table 7 examines country scores on the various rule of law measures, as well as on their
accounting standards. As before, it arranges countries by legal origin, and presents tests of
equality of means between families. The table suggests that quality of law enforcement differs
across legal ftilies. However, the picture is different from that for the legal rules.
In law enforcement, Scandinavian countries are clearly on top, with German civil law
countries close behind. These ftilies have the highest scores of any group on the efficiency of
the judicial syste~ the rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of contract
repudiation by the government. On all the measures of rule of law, common law countries are
behind the leaders, but ahead of the French civil law countries, The statistical significance of
these results varies from variable to variable. The French civil law countries are behind all others
on the quality of law enforcement just as they were on the quality of legal protections of investors.
With quality of accounting, the results are somewhat different, Scandinavia still comes
out on top, though common law countries are second, (statistically significantly) ahead of the
German civil law countries. As with all the other measures, the French family has the weakest
quality of accounting. Thus, although with these etiorcement variables common law and German
civil law countries are closer together than they were with the legal rights variables, the French
‘The measure of accounting standards we use was published in 1991, At around the same
time, European countries began to harmonize their accounting standards under the pressure from
the EC. Over time, accounting standards may converge in Europe. However, for the purposes of
our analysis of country differences, and of determinants of ownership, historical differences in the
quality of standards are obviously more important than the fiture convergence.30
civil law countries retain their last place,
These results do not support the conclusion that the quality of law enforcement
compensates for the quality of laws.
by both the laws and the system that
common law country, on average.
An investor in a French civil law country is poorly protected
enforces them. The converse is true for an investor in a
An inspection Table 7 suggests that, for the enforcement measures, the level of per capita
income may have a more important confounding effect than it did for the laws themselves. In
Table 8, we investigate whether quality of enforcement is different in different legal families
through regression analysis across countries. In the regressions, we control for each country’s
level of per capita income, The omitted dummy in the regressions is for common law countries.
By every single measure, richer countries have higher quality of law enforcement.
Nonetheless, even controlling for per capita income, the legal family matters for the quality of
enforcement and the accounting standards. A great deal of the cross-sectional variance in these
rule of law scores is explained by per capita income and the legal origin. In some cases, these
variables together explain around 80 percent of the cross-sectional variation in rule of law scores,
with the lion’s share of the explanatory power coming from per capita income.
Once income is controlled for, the conclusions change somewhat. French civil law
countries still score lower on every single measure, and statistically significantly lower for almost
all measures, than the common law countries do, However, once per capita income is controlled
for, German civil law countries tend to score lower than the common law countries on all
measures other than repudiation of contracts by govement, although the effect is significant only
for the efficiency of the judiciary and the accounting standards. Scandinavian countries arethe more elaborate legal rules, such
sophisticated accounting standards,
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as protections of oppressed minorities, might require
so that, in the absence of such standards, a legal system may
need to resort to remedial measures. Finally, the results show quite clearly that, relative to
common law countries, remedial rules are more likely to exist in civil law countries. Consistent
with our earlier findings, these results point to the need for remedial laws in countries where other
laws protect investors the least, In SUQ the results in Table 9 are consistent with the hypothesis
that remedial laws are an adaptation to poor laws protecting investors and to poor enforcement of
laws, including poor accounting standards.
6. Ownership,
In this section, we explore the hypothesis that companies in countries with poor
protections of investors adapt through concentrated ownership of their shares. The idea is that,
when investors have relatively few legal rights, then managers can be induced to return the money
to these investors is if one, or a very small number, of investors own the majority of shares.
Moreover, it is unattractive to be a small investor in such a company, since one is bound to be
expropriated by either the managers or the large investors, including the banks, themselves. In
contrast, when legal protections are stronger, it is possible for ownership to be more dispersed
and for small investors to expect a return on their capital. It may still be desirable to have some
ownership concentration, since large shareholders might monitor managers and thus increase the
value of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1986), With stronger legal protections, however, small
investors can expect to benefit from these efforts by large shareholders, and hence some
ownership dispersion is possible. This tradeoff between legal protections and ownership33
concentration, stressed by Shleifer and Vishny (1996), is tested below,
To this end, we have assembled a data base of up to 10 largest by market capitalization
non-financial (i.e., no banks) domestic (i.e., no foreign multinationals) publicly traded (i.e., not
100% privately or government held) companies in each country in our sample. In countries
where the largest publicly traded companies had some government ownership, we tried in addition
to find at least 10 comp~es with no government ownership. This changed the list substantially
in a few countries (13rtil, Austri~ Egypt). For some countries, including Egypt, India, Nigeria,
Philippines, and Zimbabwe, we could not find 10 such companies and settled for at least five.
For each company, we collected data on its three largest shareholders, and computed the
combined (cash flow) ownership stake of these three shareholders. We did not correct for the
possibility that some of the large shareholders are affiliated with each other, or that the company
itself owns the shares of its shareholders (both of these corrections would raise effective
concentration), Nor could we distinguish empirically between large shareholders who are the
management, tiliated with the management, or separate from the management. It is not clear
that a conceptual line between management and, say, a 40 percent shareholder can be drawn,
Subject to these caveats, it is possible to construct measures of ownership concentration.
For each country, we took the average and the median ownership stake of the three largest
shareholders among its 10 largest publicly traded companies. This measure resembles measures
of ownership concentration used for American companies by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer
and Vishny (1986), and Morc~ Shleifer and Vishny (1988), although concentration of ownership
in the world turns out to be very different from that in the United States,
Table 10 begins by presenting our ownership data, as usual by legal origin, Recall that we34
are getting the concentration variable from up to 10 most valuable publicly traded companies in
each country, and have a separate variable for ownership concentration using all owners, using
private owners only, and using private owners in the largest companies that have no government
ownership. As in turns out, government ownership of shares in publicly traded companies is not
that commo~ and hence the results are not particularly affected by the corrections for government
ownership. We therefore discuss the results for the companies with no government ownership.
Note finally that we have been able to obtain ownership data for 45 out of our 49 countries.
Table 10 contains perhaps the single most surprising finding of our paper. In the world as
a whole, even if we focus on the largest publicly traded companies, the average ownership of the
three largest shareholders is 46 percent, with the median of 45 percent. Dispersed ownership in
large public companies is simply a myth. Even in the United States, the average for the 10 most
valuable companies is 20 percent (which is partly explained by the fact that Microsoft, Walmart,
Coca-Cola, and Intel are on the list and all have significant ownership concentration), and the
median is 12 percent. The average concentration measure we use is under 30 percent only for the
United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Sweden. Presumably, if we
looked at smaller companies, the numbers we would get for ownership concentration would be
even larger, The finance textbook model of management faced by multitudes of dispersed
shareholders is an exception and not the rule.
Table 10 also shows that ownership concentration varies by legal origin. By far the
highest concentration of ownership is found in the French civil law countries, with the average
ownership by the three largest shareholders of a whopping 54 percent for the 10 largest non-
govemment firms. The lowest concentration is in the German civil law countries, and is equal to34 percent. Interestingly, this low
Germany, Austria, or Switzerland,
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concentration comes from East Asia rather than from
Scandinavian countries are also relatively low, with 37 percent
concentration, Finally common law countries are in the middle, with 43 percent average
ownership concentration. The differences between the French civil law countries and other legal
families are statistically significant, although other differences are not. In sum, these data indicate
that the French civil law $ountries have unusually high ownership concentratio~ just like they
have unusually poor legal protections of investors and enforcement of laws. These results are at
least suggestive that concentration of ownership is a response to poor legal protection.
In Table 11, we examine empirically the determinants of ownership concentration, in two
steps. First, we regress ownership concentration on legal origin dummies and several control
variables, to see whether origin matters, The controls we use are: (the logarithm o~ GNP per
capita on the theory that richer countries may have different ownership patterns; (the logarithm
o~ total GNP on the theory that
lower ownership concentration;
larger economies have larger firms which might therefore have
and the Gini coefficient for a country’s income on the theory --
suggested to us by several readers -- that more unequal societies have higher ownership
concentration. Second, we add to the first regression several measures of legal protections,
including accounting standards, enforcement quality, shareholder rights, creditor rights, and the
remedial rights. Given the large number of variables collected for this paper, we cannot estimate
all the possible regressions, and we need to make some choices. We pick “rule of law” as our
measure of quality of etiorcement, and several creditor and shareholder rights from Tables 2 and
3, The results we present are representative of other specifications.
Table 11 presents the results. The first regression, with all 45 observations, has an36
adjusted R-squared of 49 percent, which is high for a cross-country specification, It shows that
larger countries have lower ownership concentration, and more unequal countries have higher
ownership concentration, consistent with the conjectured effects of these controls. In addition,
the basic regression, consistent with the results in Table 10, shows a higher concentration of
ownership in the French civil law countries,
The second regression in Table 11 addresses this question. The regression has ordy 39 .
observations because, as before, data on accounting standards are incomplete, Still, an adjusted
R-squared rises to 58 percent. The coefficients on controls remain significant, and in fact the
coefficient on per capita income becomes significant and positive, The coefficient on the French
origin dummy turns negative but completely insignficiant, which suggests that our measures of
investor protections actually capture the limitations of the French civil law system. Several of the
measures of investor protection actually help determine ownership concentration. Countries with
better accounting standards and rule of law have a statistically significantly lower concentration of
ownership. A 20 point increase in the accounting score (the distance between the common law
and French civil law averages) reduces average ownership concentration by 9 percentage points,
whereas a ,4 point increase in the rule of law score (again, the distance between the common law
and French civil law averages) reduces average ownership by almost 1 percentage point,
Furthermore, countries with better shareholders’ antidirector rights, as measured by our aggregate
variable, also have a statistically significantly lower concentration of ownership. A 1,6 points
increase in the anti-director rights score (again, the distance between common law and French
civil law averages) reduces ownership concentration by 8 percentage points. In contrast, the
one-share-one-vote variable is not significant.37
The measures of creditor rights are not significant. Theoretically, the effect of creditor
rights on ownership concentration is ambiguous. One could argue that when creditor rights are
good, bank borrowing becomes pervasive, and small shareholders can free ride on the monitoring
by banks, making dispersed ownership possible. On the other hand, one could also argue that,
when creditor rights are good, bank borrowing is easier, and therefore firms will finance their
investment through debt rather tk equity, leading to higher ownership concentration in
equilibrium. The lack of empirical association between creditor rights and ownership
concentration is consistent with this theoretical ambiguity,
A word of caution is in order in interpreting these results. Some of our independent
variables, but particularly accounting standards, might be endogenous, Countries that for some
reason have heavily concentrated ownership and small stock markets might have little use for
good accounting standards, and so ftil to develop them. The causality in this case would be from
ownership concentration to accounting standards, rather than the other way around, Since we
have no instruments that we believe determine accounting but not ownership concentration, we
cannot reject this hypothesis, although we do not find it as plausible as ours. Of course, the legal
rules that we use as our independent variables, and the legal ongins that shape these rules, are
more likely to be exogenous to ownership concentration.
In sum, the message of Table 11 is that the quality of legal protection of shareholders, as
well as the extent of protection of the voting process against manipulation by directors, are
significant determinants of ownership concentration. Moreover, between them, these variables
account for the higher concentration of ownership in the French civil law countries, The results
support the idea that heavily concentrated ownership results from, and perhaps substitutes for,38
poor protection of investors in a corporate governance system, The evidence indicates that poor
laws actually make a difference and may have costs. One of these costs of heavily concentrated
ownership in large firms is that their core investors are not diversified, The other cost is that
these firms probably face difEculty raising equity fimce, since minority investors fear
expropriation by managers and concentrated owners.
7. Per capita income.
In the previous sections, we have presented results in which we controlled for per capita
income in assessing the dtierences between the legal ftilies. We have established that per capita
income is not the whole story. In this sectioq we focus on per capita income itself as a
determinant of a country’s law and its etiorcement. Do poor countries have systematically worse
legal protections than rich countries do? If this were the case, then the possibility would exist
that poor countries are stuck in a bad equilibrium of inadequate legal protection and scarce
external finance, which would stunt growth and therefore keep them poor and with inadequate
legal protection. On the other hand, if per capita income is not a critical determinant of effective
legal protection, then even if poor laws slow down financing and investment, countries can still
grow out of the trap. In this sectio~ we attempt to shed some light on these issues.
In Table 12, we sort countries by per capita income into the bottom quartile, middle 50
percent, and the top quartile. We then compare the means of some of our variables across per
capita income groups. Shareholder rights do not systematically depend on the level of per capita
income. Table 12 shows this for the aggregate quality of shareholder rights variable, but the
result holds for individual rights as well. The unimportance of per capita income as a determinant39
of shareholder rights is apparent from the regressions in Table 4, which control for legal origin.
Table 12 also suggests that some of the creditor rights, such as the restriction on
managers’ right to unilaterally seek protection from creditors, no automatic stay on assets, and
the replacement of managers in bankruptcy proceedings, actually get weaker in richer countries.
Some of these results, in weaker form, appear in the regressions in Table 4, which control for
legal origin. Interestingly, the one measure that rises most clearly with income is management
staying in reorganization. It is possible that the relative anti-management stance of poor
countries’ bankruptcy laws is dictated by efficiency: unless creditors get their hands on the assets
fast, these assets are likely to disappear. It is also possible that, in richer countries, management
lobbying has succeeded in emasculating creditor rights. The aggressive pro-management stance
of the U.S. bankruptcy law is consistent with both of these interpretations. In any event, there is
no evidence that poor countries have weaker creditor rights.
As we already reported in Table 8, however, the efficiency of the judicial system and rule
of law both increase substantially with the level of income. In fact, per capita G~ alone explains
over half of the variation in efiorcement measures. The quality of the accounting standards also
rises sharply with per capita income, although we have very few observations for the poorer
countries, The picture is thus very different for law enforcement than it is for legal rules.
In summary, the data provide no evidence of a legal trap: systematically weaker laws
protecting investors in poorer countries. There is no systematic correlation between income and
shareholder rights, and, if anything, some creditor rights are weaker in richer countries. What this
means is that some countries -- such as Italy and France -- have managed to get rich despite
having few laws that protect investors. On the other hand, richer countries have a clearly higher40
quality of law enforcement, The failure of poor countries to consistently etiorce basic investor
protections may well help keep them poor.
8. Conclusions.
In this paper, we have examined laws governing investor protection, the quality of
enforcement of these laws, and ownership concentration in 49 countries around the world. The
analysis suggests three broad conclusions.
First, laws differ markedly around the world, though in most places they tend to give
investors a rather limited bundle of rights. In particular, countries whose legal rules originate in
the common law tradition tend to protect investors considerably better than do the countries
whose laws originate in the civil law, and especially the French civil law, tradition. The German
civil law and the Scandinavian countries take an intermediate stance toward investor protections.
There is no clear evidence that different countries favor different types of investors; the evidence
rather points to a relatively stronger stance favoring all investors in common law countries. This
evidence confirms our basic hypothesis that being a shareholder, or a creditor, in different legal
jurisdictions entitles an investor to very different bundles of rights. These rights are determined
by laws; they are not inherent in securities themselves.
Second, law etiorcement differs a great deal around the world. German civil law and
Scandinavian countries have the best quality of law enforcement, although this reflects to some
extent their higher average income levels, Law enforcement is strong in common law countries as
well, whereas it is the weakest in the French civil law countries. These rankings also hold for one
critical input into law enforcement in the area of investor protections: the accounting standards.41
These standards are ranked the lowest in the French civil law countries, where an investor is
generally protected neither by the laws nor by high quality law enforcement. The quality of law
enforcement, unlike the legal rights themselves, improves sharply with the level of income.
Third, we have examined the concentration of ownership in publicly traded companies
around the world, and investigated the hypothesis that highly concentrated ownership is an
adaptive response to poor investor protection in a corporate governance system. To begin, we
have shown that ownership concentration is extremely high around the world, consistent with our
evidence that laws, on average, are not terribly protective of investors. In an average country,
close to half the equity in a publicly traded company is owned by the three largest shareholders.
Good accounting standards, rule of law, and shareholder protection measures are highly
negatively correlated with the concentration of ownership. These results suggest that inadequate
protection of investors maybe costly. Specifically, if small investors are not protected,
companies would not be
diversi~ their holdings.
able to raise capital from the~ and entrepreneurs would not be able to
High ownership concentration, then, may be a symptom of a poorly
functioning capital market.
These findings leave us with a puzzle. The most widely spread legal family, that
originating in the French civil law, appears to have the worst efficiency properties from the
perspective of corporate governance.
chosen by at least some governments,
While this system was often not adopted voluntarily, it was
and has survived for decades around the world. How can
it be so popular it as our results suggest, it is so bad? One possible answer is that, when
countries adopt a legal system, their leaders are more focused on its revolutionary spirit and on
the more basic rights than those of investors. The legal reformers borrow the legal systems42
wholesale, without excessive focus on whether shareholders can vote by mail. Another possible
answer -- related to arguments made in Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) -- is that the legal system
does not matter very much, and that investors can generally contract around the limitations of the
legal system. This answer, however, does not square with our evidence on ownership if one
believes that extreme ownership concentration is costly, Even if one gives some credence to
these arguments, the suMv~ and spread of rules that appew so inferior remains puzzling,
The ultimate question that needs to be answered to deal with this puzzle, of course, is
whether countries with poor investor protections -- either laws or their enforcement -- actually do




systems less developed? Are companies in these countries incapable of getting
We defer this analysis to our follow-up paper, and for now leave the puzzle43
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Press.TABLE 1: The Variables
This table describes the variables collected for the 49 countries included in our study. The first column gives the name of
the variable. The second column describes the variable and gives the range of possible values. The third column provides
the sources from which the variable was collected.
Variable Dmcription Source9
origin Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of wh country. Foreign Law Encyclopedia
Equals 1if the origin is English Common Law; 2 if the origin is the French Commercial Commercial Laws of the
Code; and 3 if the origin is the German Commercial Code. World.
OneShare-One Vote Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code of the country requires that Company Law or
ordinary shares carry one vote per share, and Ootherwise, Equivalently, this variable Commercird Code
equals one when the law prohibits the existence of both multiple-voting and non-voting
ordinary shares and does not allow fms to set a maximum number of votes per
shareholder _ive of the number of shares she owns, and Ootherwise.
Proxyby mail Equals one ~the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to mail their Company Law or
proxy vote, and Ootherwise. Commercird Code
$hares blocked before Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows firms to require that Company Law or
neeting shareholders deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholders Meeting thus Commercial Code
preventing them from =Iling those shares for a number of day$ and Ootherwise.
:urnulative voting Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to cast dl of Company Law or
their votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of directors, and O Commercial Code
otherwise.
*pressed minorities Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code grants minority shareholders Company Law or
nechanism either ajudicial venue to challenge the management decisions or the right to step out of Commercial Code
the ampany by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they object to
certain tidarnentrd changes, such as merge~ assets dispositions and changes in the
articles of incorporation. The variable equals O otherwise.
?ercentage of Share It is the minimum percentage of ownership of share Capiti that entitles a shareholder to Company Law or
~apital to Call an call for an Exbaordin~ Shareholders’ Meeting. It ranges horn one to 33 percent. Commercial Code
ZXmrdinary
Shareholders’ Meeting
titidtiors Rights An index aggregating the shareholder rights which we labeled as “anti-director rights.” Company Law or
The index is formed by adding I when: (1) the coun@ allows shareholders to mail their Commercial Code
proxy VOW, (2) shareholders are not quired to deposit their shares prior to the General
Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative voting is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities
mechanism is in place; or (5) when the minimum Permntage of share Capiti that entitles
a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to
10% (the sample median). The index ranges fim Oto 5.
Mandatory Dividend ~uals the pemntage of net income that the Company Law or Commercial Code Comprmy Law or
requires fms to distribute as dividends among ordinary stockholders. It takes a value of Commercial Code
Ofor counlries without such restriction.
Restrictions on filing a Equals one if the rmrganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ Bankruptcy and
Rmrgani~tion petition mnsen~ to file for reorganization. It equals Oif there are no such restrictions. Reorganization Laws
Automatic S~y on Equals one if the reorgantiion prtiure imposes an automtiic stay on the assets of the Bankruptcy and
Secured &seb firm upon filing the organization petition, This restriction prevents secured creditors Reorganization Laws
to gain possession of their security, It equal Oif such restriction does not exist in the
law,
Secured Creditors First Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that Bankruptcy and
result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Equals zero if non-secured Reorganization Laws
creditors, such as the Government and workers, are given absolute priority.
Management Stays Equals one if the debtor keeps the administition of its property pending the resolution Bankruptcy and
of the reorganization pro~ss, and zero otherwise. Equivantly, this variable equals zero Reorganization Laws
when an official appointed by the CO- or by the creditors, is responsible for the
operation of the business during reorganization.Variable Description Sources
Legal Reserve It is the percentage of total share capital mandated by Corporate Law to avoid the Company Law or
dissolution of an existing firm. It takes a value of zero for countries without such Commercial Code
restriction.
Efficiency of Judicial Assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it tiects Business International
System business, particularly foreign frrms’’produced by the country-risk rating agency Business Corporation.
[nternationuf Corpation. It “may be taken to represent investors’ assessments of
renditions in the country in question”. Average between 1980-1983. Scrdefrom Oto
10, with lower scores lower efficiency levels.
Rule of Law Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produ~ by the counhy-risk International Counby Wsk
mting agency International Counhy Risk (ICR). Average of the months of April and Guide
October of the monthly irtdex betw~rt 1982 and 1995. Scale from Oto 10,with lower
wres for less tradition for law and order.(We changed the scrde of this variable tim its
original rartge go~g tim Oto 6).
Corruption ICR’S -ent of the arruption in government. Lower scores indicate “high International Court@ Risk
government officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal paymenfi are Guide
generaJly ex~ted throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes
comected with import and export license%exchange control$ tax assessmen~ policy
protectio~ or loans”. Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index
between 1982 and 1995. Scale from Oto 10,with lower wres for higher levels of
corruption. (We changed the scale of this variable horn its originaJ range from Oto 6).
Risk of Expropriation ICR’S assessment of the risk of “outright mnfiscation” or “ford nationalization”. International Country Risk
Avemge of the monti of April and October of the monthly index betwm 1982 and Guide
1995. Scale from Oto 10, with lower scores for higher risks
Repudiation of ICR’S assessment of the “risk of a modification in a contmct taking the form of a International Country Risk
Contracts by repudiation, postponemen~ or soling down” due to “budget cutbacks, indigenization Guide
Government pressure, a change in government or a change in government economic and social
priorities.” Average of the months of April and October of tie monthly index between
1982 and 1995. Scale horn Oto 10,with lower scores for higher risks.
Amunting standards Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their International Accounting
inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items fall into 7 categories (general and Auditing Trends,
information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statemeng accounting Center for International
standards, stock data and spwial items). A minimum of 3 companies in each country Financial Analysis &
were studied. me companies represent a cross-section of various industry groups where Research Inc.
industrial wmpanies numbered 70’??o while financial mmpanies represented the
remaining 30%.
Ownership, 10largest The average peruntage of mmmon shares owned by the tJrreelargest shareholders in the Moodys International,




Ownemhip, 10 largest The average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the Moo&s International,
private fares ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given coun~. A furn is CIFA~ , EXTEL,
considered privately owned if the State is not a known shareholder in iL Worl&cope, 20-Fs, Price-
Waterhouse and various
country sources.
GNP and GNP per Gross NationaJ Product and Gross National Product per capita expressed in mnstant World Bank and LMF
capita dollars of 1994.
Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient for income inequali~ in each munby. When the 1990 coefficient is Deininger and Squire
not available, we use the most recent available. (1996); World BankThistable clmsifies munties



























































a=slgsufieant at 1Y olevel; b
Table 2: Shareholder Rights around the World
legal origin and shows the shareholders’ rights foreach wuntsy. Exact definitions of each shareholders’ right can be fomd in Table 1.
or the different Iegat origins
1
Purrc/A S-HOLDERS’ IUGHTS (I=exists in tie law)
One share - Proxy by mail Shares blocked Cumulative oppressed % of Share Capital Antidi~or Mandatory









































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.22 0.22 0.27 0.16 0.53 0.11 2.44 0.06
Purrel B Tmls Of Means (t-statistic)
-0.03 2.16b -4.65 ‘ 0,05 4.48 a -1.14 5.24 “ 2.82 “
4.11 2.25 b -3,s7 “ 4.19 4.14 ‘ -1.98’ 5.13’ 2.99 ‘
-0.52 0.98 -3,16’ 0.00 3.13 ‘ 2.42 c 3.66’ 0.00
2.20 b 0.50 0.00 1.84” 3.25 ‘ -0.87 2.14b 0.00
-0.45 -0.47 -1.01 0.13 0.00 2.34 b -0.47 2,99 ‘
2.50 b -0.85 3.51 “ 2.17b 0.31 1.90’ -1,25 2.99 ‘
1.58 -0.29 3,16b 1.00 0,25 4.62 ‘ -0.98 0.00
Igs-lltle.ant at 5“/.level ; c=Slgnli(mt at 1O%Ievel; d=ss a pmntage of votes; &as a prcentage of the numk of sksTable 3: Creditor Righta around the World
Ttdstable classifies auntries by Ie al origin and shows the creditors’ ri~ts for each counby. Exact definitions for each creditors’





























































a = Significant at 10/0 level ; b=
P-i A CREDITOR.SRIGHTS (1= existsinthe law)
Rtictions for Automatic Secured Crcditom
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ParreJB Tabk of Mans (t-statistics)
1.71 c -2.47 ‘ 1.59 4.05 ‘ -5.47’
1.74 ‘ -2.88 ‘ 2.34 b -3.54 ‘ -5.19 ‘
1.63 -0.17 -1.00 -1.99’ -6.35 *
-0.17 -1.73’ -1.00 -7.21 ‘ -5.90 ‘
0.37 1.84’ -3.24 ‘ 0.39 -1.05
-1.18 -0.05 -3.24 ‘ -2.52 b 0.42
-1.26 -1.26 0.00 -1.58 1.09
pifimt at 50/. level ; c =Significarst at Io?/olevel.Table 4: Investors Rights, hgal Origin and GNP Regressions
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SURE) of the cross section of 49 countries around the world. The dependent variables are:
(1) one share-one vote ; (2) proxy by mail; (3) shares blocked before meeting; (4) cumulative voting; (5) oppressed minorities
mechanism (6) percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting (ESM); (7) mandatory dividend; (8)
restrictions on reorganization; (9) automatic stay on assets (10) secured creditors’ first (11) management stays in
reorganization; (12) legal reserve. The independent variables are (1) the log of GNP per capita and the set of “legal origins”
dummies which include (a) “French Origin”; (b) “German Origin”; (c). “Scandinavian Origin”; and a Constant.
Independent Variables
LogofGNP French German Scandinavian Constant
per Capita ongin origin origin
DEPENDENT VARS.
Shareholders’ Righb
















































Num, of Obs =46
“RZ-=.3037






































Num, of Obs =46
“RZ”=1883













Num. of Obs =46
“F”=.1645
0.1129 b 0.4373 ‘ -0.1393
(0.0509) (0.1502) (0.2283)
0.0094 -0.3101 ‘ 0.0438
(0.0408) (o.1207) (0.1833)
0.1389’ 0.4948 ‘ 0.2116



















-0.0165 0.2070 ‘ 0.2951 a 0.1863 ‘ 0.1424
(0.0138)
Num. of Obs =46
(0-~09) (cI.()(j23) (0.0726) (0.1188) “RI”=d(jj 1
a=Significant at 10/0level; b= Significant at 5°/0 level; c= Significant at 10°/0 level.TABLE 5: Legal Origin, Shareholder and Creditor Rights
Thefollowing table reports F-tests based on a SURE regression model. The dependent variable is the stack of shareholder and creditor
righ~ by mun~ and the independent variables are the log of GNP per capita and the set of dummies for the different legal origins. The
four legal origins are: (1) English; (2) French; (3) German; and (4) Scandinavian . Panel A reports F-tests on the significance of legal
origins for the set of shareholders’ rights. Panel B repofi F-tests on the significance of legal origins for the set of creditors’ rights. Finally,
panel C reports F-tests on the significance of legal origins for both setsof shareholder and creditor righmtogether. F-statistics are reported
with theu-associated probabili~ underneath in parenthesis.
PANEL A: Shareholder Rights
Mother France Germany Scandinavia Mother “I” against the
world (=0)
Engknd F statistic 11.66 4.65 2.25 10.07
(Prob > F) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0496) (0,0000)
France F statistic I.97 3.19 7.75
@b>F) , (0.0829) (0.0086) (0.0000)
Germany F stati~c 2.41 2.15
(Prob > F) (0.0369) (0.0588)
Scandinavia F statistic 2,06
(Prob > F) (0.0688)
All mothers are equal to each F statistic 5.32
other @rob > F) (0.000o)
PANEL B: Creditor Rights
Mother Franu Certiany Scandinavia Mother “I” against the
world (=0)
Engknd F statistic 11.36 6.18 3.87 13.17
(Prob > F) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0058) (0.000o)
France F statistic 2.28 1.03 5.73





Scandinavia F statistic 1.22
(Prob > F) (0.3157)
All mothers are equal to each F statistic 5.30
other (Prob > F) (o.ooOO)
PANEL C: Shareholder and Creditor Righta
Mother France Germany Scandinavia Mother “1” against the
world (+)
England F statistic 12.95 7.27 2.71 12.51
(Prob > F) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0086) (0.0000)
France F s~istic 2.24 2.17 5.93
(Prob > F) (0.0272) (0.0325) (0.0000)
Germany F statistic 2.55 2.91
(Prob > F) (0.0128) (0.0050)
Scandinavia F statistic 2.01
(Prob > F) (0.0567)
All mothers are equal to each F statistic 6.05
other (Prob > F) (0,0000)Table 7: Rule of Law
This table classifies counhies by legal origin and shows the politicaJ variables for each munby. Exact definitions for each of the variables can be found in
Tale 1.Panel B gives the tests of means for the different legaJorigins.
Panel A ENFORCEMENT VARIABLES ACCOUNTING GNP PER
CAPITA
COUNTRY Eficiency of Rule of Law Corruption Risk of Risk of Con~ct Rating on Acmunting (U.S. $)
iudiciaJsvstem ExDrooriation Repudiation standards
Australia 10,00 10.00 8.52 9.27 8.71 75
Canada
17,500
9,25 10.00 10.00 9.67 8.96 74
Hong Kong
19,970
10,00 8,22 8.52 8.29 8.82 69
Jndla
18,060
8.00 4,17 4.58 7.75 6.11 57
Jrelmd 8.75
300
7.80 8.52 9.67 8.96 na
-I
13,000
10.00 4.82 8.33 8.25 7.54 64
Kenya
13,920
5.75 5.42 4.82 5.98 5.66 270
MaJaysia 9.00 6,78 7.38 7.95 7,43 E 3,140
New ~and 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.69 9.29 70
Nigeria
12,600
7.25 2.73 3.03 5,33 4.36 59 300
Pakistan 5.00 3.03 2.98 5.62 4,87 430
Singapore 10.00 8.57 8.22 9,30 8.86 ;:
south Africa
19,850
6.00 < 4.42 8.92 6.88 7,27 70 2,980
Sri Lanka 7.00 1.90 5.00 6.05 5.25 na 600
Nand 6.25 5,18 7.42 7.57 64 2,110
UK :02d 8.57 9.10 9.71 9.63
us
78 18,060
10.00 10,00 8.63 9.98 9.00 71 24,740
Zimbabwe 7.50 3.68 5.42 5.61 5.04 520
Avg. English origin &15 6.46 7.06 7.91 7.41 6~.:2 9353
Argentina ‘ 6,00 5.35 6.02 5.91 4.91 45 7,220
Belgium 9.50 10.00 8.82 9.63 9.48 61 21,650
Btazil 5.75 6.32 6.32 7.62 6,30 54 2,930
Chile 7.25 7.02 5.30 7,50 6.80 52 3,170
tilombia 7.25 2.08 5.00 6.95 7,02 50 1,400
6.25 6.67 5.18 6.57 5,18 1,200
Egypt 6.50 4.17 3.87 6.30 6.05 ;:
France 8.00 8.98 9.05 9.65 9.19 69 22,?;
Oreece 7.00 6.18 7.27 7.12 6.62 55 7,390
[ndonesia 2.50 3.98 2.15 7.16 6.09 na 740
[taJy 6.75 8.33 6.13 9.35 9.17 62 19,840
Jordan 8.66 4.35 5.48 6,07 4,86 na 1,190
Mexim 6.00 5.35 4.77 7.29 6.55 60 3,610
Netherlmds 10,00 10.00 10,00 9,98 9,35 64 20,950
Pem 6.75 2.50 4.70 5.54 4,68 38 I,490
Philippines 4.75 2.73 2.92 5,22 4,80 65 850
Pomsgal 5.50 8.68 7.38 8,90 8,57 36 9,130
spain 6.25 7.80 7.38 9,52 8,40 64 13,590
Turkey 4.00 5.18 5.18 7,00 5,95 51 2,970
Uruguay 6.50 5.00 5.00 6,58 7,29 31 3,830
Venezuela 6.50 6.37 4.70 6.89 6,30 2,840
Avg. French origin 6.56 6.05 5.84 7.46 6.84 5::7 7,102
Austria 9.50 10.00 8.57 9.69 9.60 54 23,510
Germany 9.00 9.23 8.93 9.90 9.77 62 23,560
Japan 10.00 8.98 8.52 9.67
SouthKorea
9.69 65 31,490
6.00 5.35 5.30 8.31 8.59 62 7,660
SwikerJand 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.98 9.98 68 35,760
Taiwan 6.75 8.52 6.85 9.12 9.16 65 10,425
Avg. Gcrm#sr origin 854 8.68 8.03 9.45 9.47 62.67 22,067
Denmark 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.67 9.31 62 26,730
FinJand 10.00 10,00 10.00 9.67 9.15 77 19,300
Norway 10.00 10,00 10.00 9.88 9.71 74 25,970
Sweden 10,00 10,00 10,00 9.40 9.58 83 24,740
Avg.Scandinavian origin 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.66 9.44 74.00 24,185
Total Average 7.67 6.85 6.90 8.05 7.58 60.93 11,1s6
Porrel B: Tub of Mesns (t-statistics)
Commonvs. Civil Law 1,27 -0,77 0.39 -0.46 -0.51 3.12 ‘ -0.94
England vs. France 2,65 ‘ 0.51 1.79‘ 0.90 1,06 4.66 ‘ 0.85
England vs. Oermany -0.41 -1,82’ -0.93 -2.t9b -2.79 ‘ 2.22 b -2,86 a
Engtand vs. Scandinavia -3.78 n -15.57 ‘ -5,38 C -2.06 b -2.26 ‘ -1,05 -3.24 ‘
Fronw VS. ~rm~y -2,53 ‘ -2.55 ‘ -2.49 ‘ -3.20 l -3.90 ‘ -2.10 b -3.79 ‘
France vs. Scandinavia -9.34 a -20.80 ‘ -9.77 a -2,94 a -3.17” -3.32 ‘ -4.28 ‘
Oermany vs. Scandinavia -2.06 ‘ -11.29’ -2.88 ‘ -0.63 0,10 -2.66 ‘ -0.36
----- .. A,... . . ..-. . .. . . . . . .. . . .-”, ,. a=slgnmcam or 170level; n=hIgnmcant as370level; c=31gnlIIcanta[ Iu70levelTable 8: bgal Origins, Rule of Law and Accounting Regressions
Ordinary least square regressions of the cross-section of 49 countries around the world. The dependent variables are: (1)
efficiency of the judiciary system; (2) rule of law; (3) corruption; (4) risk of expropriation; (5) repudiation of contracts by
government; and (6) accounting standards in each country. The independent variables for the first regression in each panel
are the log of GNP per capita and the set of “legal origin” dummies (French, German, Scandinavian and the omitted dummy
being English). The second regression in the panel of each dependent variable includes the log of GNP per capita and a
dummy variable “Civil Law” which takes a value equal to 1when the country belongs to the civil law tradition (i.e. all French,
German and Scandinavian Codes), and Owhen the country belongs to the “Common Law” tradition (i.e. English Common























Log of GNP Civil Law French Germs Scandinavian Intercept
per Capita ‘ dummy origin origin origin
0.8421 i .... .. -1.6609 * -1.0305 ‘ 0.2392 1.2677 Num.of Obs =49
(0.1374) (0.4544) (0.5717) (0.3364) (1.2185) A~ustedR’ = .5330
0.9763 a -1.3774 a ------- -. ..... ------- 0.1702 Num, of Obs =49
(0.1312) (0.4103) (1.2462) A~usted R2 = .4975
................................................. .............................................................................................................. ........................... ....
1.4761 ‘ --—--- -0.5250 -0.2715 0.7174 -5.6050 ‘ Num.of Obs =49
(0.1502) (0.4325) (0.5981) (0.4436) (1.2887) A~ustedRz = .7538
1.5541 ‘ -0.3642 ------- ------- ..----- -6.2421 ‘ Num.of Obs =49
(0.1336) (0.4156) (1.1711) A~ustedR2 = .7501
................................................. ................................................................................................. ............................ ................
1.3088 ‘ ------- -1.3236 a -1.2422 ‘ 0.4369 -3.6367 ‘ Num.of Obs =49
(0.1076] (0.3023) (0.4500) (0.2986) (0.9363) A~ustedR’ =.7183
1.4020 ‘ -1.1388’ ------- ....... ------- -4.3986 ‘ Num. of Obs =49
(0.0962) (0.2929) (0.8440) A@usted R2 = .6853
................................................................................................................................................................. ........................... ..
0.9098 m -0.5164 b -0.0009 0.0054 0.4732 Num. of Obs =49
(0.0883) (0.2386) (O.1987) (0.2124) (0.7989) A~ustedR2 = .7949
0.9679 a -0.3855 c -------. -------- ------- -0.0018 Num. of Obs =49
(0.0747) (0.2066) (0.6958) A~ustedRz = .7911
................................................. ............................................................................................................. .......................... .....
0.9951 a ------- -0.6459 ‘ 0.3803 b 0.1300 -0.7290 Num.of Obs =49
(0.0788) (0.2388) (0.1844) (0.1985) (0.6870) A~usted R’ = .8326
1.0976 ‘ -0.4111 ‘ ------- ------- ------- -1.5671 ‘ Num. of Obs =49
(0.0710) (0.2158) (0.6291) A~ustedR’ = .8066
.............................................................................................................................................................. .......................... ......
4.3348 a ------- -17.3661 -11.890’ -1.5272 31.8070 Num. of Obs =41
(1.1669) (2.7591) (2.7271) (4.4562) (10.161) A~usted R= = .5694
5.774 a -14.331 ‘ ------- ------- .------ 19.249 c Num.of Obs =4]
(1.2426) (2.6385) (11.015) A~wted R2 = .4875
a=Significant at 10/0level; b= Significant at 5°/0 level; c= Significant at 10°/0 level.Table 9: Remedial Rights
Ordinary Least Square regressions of the cross-section of 49 countries around the world. The dependent variables are: (1) a
“Mandatory Dividends” dummy which is equal to 1if the law requires a mandatory dividend, and Ootherwise; (2) a “Legal
Reserves” dummy variable equal to 1if the law requires the existence of a legal reserve, and Oothemise; and (3) a “Remedial
Rights” dummy variable equal to 1 if the law requires either the existence of a mandatory dividend or the existence of a legal
reseme. The independent variables are: (1) the log of GNP per capita which comes from; (2) the efficiency of thejudiciary
system; (3) the index of quality of accounting stidards in the country; and (4) the set of “legal origin” dummies (French,


























































a= s~l~t at 1% level; b= Significant at 5% level; c= Si@cant at 10% level.Table 10: Large Shareholders around the World
me followingtable provi&s omemhip of tirms by large shareholders io the cross-section of 49 cotmtries. The fit mlumrt gives the average percentage of common shares
owed by the 3 largest shareholders in the 10 large~ domestsc tirrns in the non-fmanclsd sector in each counh-y, ‘fhe sewnd column provides ,tie average
wmmoo stock omed by the 31 cst shareholders excluding the govcrmnen4 that is, when the govensment was one of the largest shareholders It was substl, ted w
nextl~-xholdcr. ~e=~lumnshowsthe average
“r=n@Ei:
“-~~~~~d~%~~-~~d~~~ ~~~older in it. Thefoti column gives the medan.wnershl~ oti whc6rms rnagivert.wmtry A firmiswnsl
est shareholders m the ten largest non-tinanc!at, prtiafely-
ofthe 3 Ianswt shareholders in the 10laruest non-financial Drrvafefv-owed~mes&ic firms, me last two whmsns urovide averaee market cauitsl of the 10iirrns in eac
.-. .... —“... “. -— . . . . . . . . . .
Pd,4 Owoership (10Lnrge firms)
Owrship byIk tie ~est Shareholders
cout4TRY
W&t Cqitalizalion oJFti
10Laracss Non F-d hestic Firms 10Lqw private tirnss 10 LO.5t 10 Mgest
Priv-v Private
(includesgovmt) (excludes govhn) mm medians ( MillionsofUSS)
Ausbalis 0.32 0,32 0.28 0.28 5,940 5,943
Cansds 0.40 0,39 0.40 0.24 3,589 3,015
HongKong 0.54 0,54 0.54 0.54 4,282 4,282
Ma 0.41 0,38 0.40 0.43
bland
1,558 1,721
0.39 0.39 0,39 0.36 944 944
bl 0.49 0.44 0.51 0.55 5s0 428
Kenys 27 27
Wysu 0?4 0% 0?4 0?2 4,427 2,0 I3
sew md 0.48 0.48 0,48 0.51 1,019 1,019
v- 0.46 0,43 0,40 0.45 39 39
mkistsn 0.45 0.26 0,37 0.41 92 49
$- 0.49 0,49 0.49 0.53 1,637
M Ma 0.52 0,52
1,637
0.52 0,52 6,23a 6.23a
Mm 0,60 0,60 0.60 0,61 4 4
rbailMd 0,46 0.44 0.47 o,4a 1,009 996
JK 0,22 0.17 0.19 0,15 21,019 1a,5il
JS 0,20 0.20 0.20 0.12 71,650 71,650
~~w 0.54 0.41 0.55 0.51 63 28
LW E~h Ox a4s 0.41 0.43 a42 6~ 6*
- 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.55 2,90a 2,185
klgium 0.57 0.48 0.54 0.62 3,539 3,4457
ISs?il 0.66 0.31 0.57 0.63 7,37a 1,237
m o.4a 0.41 0.45 o.3a 2,415 2,330
hlolnbia 0.63 0.63 0,63 o.6a 457 457
~
~w 070 0;1 0?2 0?2 2; 1:
:- 0.33 0.22 0.34 0.24 I1,713 8,914
3ruce 0.69 0.62 0.67 0.68 21a 163
ndase9is 0.63 0.53 0.58 0.62 1,366 a82
taly 0.58 o.5a o.5a 0.60 3,140 3,140
‘* 63 63
Wexiw O?a ova ova 027 2,924 2,954
ti~ 0.43 0,33 0.39 0,31 a,05a 6,400
leru 0.50 0.47 0.56 0,57 427 I54
Wli* 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.51 867 156
‘- 0.52 0.52 0.52 0,59 259 259
;@ 0.43 0,34 0.51 0,50 3,154 1,256
r- 0.61 0.47 0.59 0,58 701 477
Jntgusy IIS IIS IIS
{~la M M 0?1 089 Ira 4;
4~ Fre6eb origin 0.56 0.45 O.M 0.55 2,775 1~
id o.@ 0.53 0.58 0.51 442 325
.
~Y 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.50 9,465 8,5M
w 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.13 37,532 26,677
M Kores 0.23 0,23 0.23 0.20 1,034 1,034
;ti~ 0,4I 0,41 0.4I o.4a 9,578 9,57a
rtiw 0,23 0,16 0.18 0.14 3,0a5 2,186
i~ German origin 036 0.31 034 033 lQla9 %057
0.45 0.45 0.45 0,40 1,273 1,273
:inlerai 0.44 0.20 0,37 0.34 2272 1,980
~my 0.40 0.35 0.36 0.31 1,561 l,IM
I* o.2a 0,27 o,2a o.2a 6,a30 6.216
\v& =ndinmvtim origtn 0.39 0.32 037 033 3,059 2,644
rotal Avemge 0.47 0.40 0.46 0.45 5J79 4J21
Pti BTeatofM=m (t-statistics)
. ~ vs. CivilLaw -1,05 0,12 -I.1O -0.91 0.69 1.Cm3
Enalandvs. Franw -3.11’ -1,02 -3.24 ‘ -2.6a ‘ 1.02 1,22
EngtandVS. ~y 1.52 1.62 1.38 1.31 -0.43 4.20
_ vs.~via 0,92 1.41 1.05 1.22 0.44 0.46
F- vs.Ge-y 3,59 n 2.02 b 3.a7s 3.29 ‘ -2,17’ -2.61 b
F- vs. Scandinavia 3.06 ‘ 1.71’ 3.93 “ 3.32 ‘ -0.16 -0.61
Germanyvs. Scandinavia -0.40 -0.08 -0.24 -0.06 0.99 1.05
a=Sj~ifiCan[at I0/0 level. &–Simificant at 5“/0 level; c=Significant at 10”/0 levelTABLE 11: OWNERSHIP REGRESSIONS
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross section of 49 countries around the world. The dependent variable is “ Ownership” which is the average
percentage of common skes owned by the three largest shareholders in the ten largmt privately -owneddomestic fm given in a given country. A firm
is considered privately owned if the state is not a known shareholder in it, The independent variables are (1) log of GNP per capita; (2) log of GNP;
(3) Girti Coefficient; (4) the rule of law in the country which refers to an index of law and order tradition in the country; (5) the index for acmunting
standards in the country; (6) French legal origin; (~ German legal origin; (8) Scandimvian legal origin; (9) the antidirectors shareholders’ rights index
(calculated as indicated in Table 1); (10) “one share-one vote” that equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code of the country requires that
ordinary shares carry one vote per share, and Ootherwise; (11) mandatory dividend which equals the percentage of net inmme that the Company Law
or the Commercial Code of the wuntty requires f- to distribute as dividend among ordinary stockholders; (12) “secured creditors first” which equals
1 if -ed creditors are rtiti first in the distribution of the pr- that rdt from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; (13) “automatic
stay on assets” of the ti upon fding the reorgtilon petition and; (14) the legal reserve quirement which is the minimum percentage of total share
capital ~ by Company hw or the Commercial Code of the muntry to avoid the dissolution of an existing firm. White (1980) corrected standard
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0.0077 0.0611’
(0.0097) (0.0185)































~= si~fificant at 1% level; b= Significant at 5% level; c= Significant at 10% level..
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